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AREAS OF POSITIVE LAW: PROPERTY,
CRIMINAL LAW, AND CONTRACTS
SHUFCAH: ORIGINS AND MODERN DOCTRINE
FARHAT J. ZIADEH*
A n interesting institution of Islamic law is shufah, or real property
preemption, which may be defined as the right of a person to sub-
stitute himself for the purchaser in a complete sale of real property. By
virtue of an interest he has as a co-owner, a sharer in right of way, or an
adjoining neighbor, he would acquire ownership of such property under
certain conditions. Linguistically, shuftah is derived from the root sh f c
which can signify either one of two meanings: (1) to intercede on behalf of
someone, or (2) to render double, to couple two things together, or to add
one thing or action to another. The two meanings are found in the Koran,
for example, "Who is he that intercedeth (yashfae) with Him save by His
leave?" (Koran 2:255), and "By... the Even (shaf) and the Odd" (Koran
89:3). Characteristically, because intercession is accomplished by a re-
quest or entreaty, some philologists think that shuftah is derived from
shafacah (intercession) because it involves a request. However, they could
not ignore the other meaning of adding one thing to another. This led
Bustani in Qutr al Muhi ti to say, "Shuf ah is to intercede (tashfac) in that
which you request, so that you add it to what you have; you thus (tas-
hfacuhu), i.e. increase it." Lane,2 on the other hand, correctly chooses the
latter meaning. He quotes from his authorities, which say that al-shaf/
"signifies the adjoining of a thing to its like" and shufica al-milk signifies
"the possession was coupled by purchase with another possession."
Two of the early schools of law, the Mdliki and the ShAfici, restrict the
right to exercise shufah to the co-owner, while a third school, the Hanafi,
also gives it to an adjoining neighbor and to the sharer in a private road
that services his property and the property sold. Likewise, by extension,
the Hanafi would give this right to the sharer in a course of water that
irrigates both his property and that of an adjoining neighbor. The ques-
tion arises as to whether the more extensive doctrine was the original
common doctrine of the early Muslims which was later restricted by the
MAliki and Shafici schools to the co-owner, or whether the original com-
*Professor, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilization, University of
Washington; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law; B.A., Amer-
ican University of Beirut; LL.B., University of London; Barrister-at-Law, Lincloln's Inn,
London.
1 B. BuSTAN,, QuTR AL-MU.T, entry sh-f-c (Beirut 1869).
2 E. LANE, AN ARABIC-ENGLISH LEXICON, entry sh-f-c (London 1872).
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mon doctrine was the restrictive one which was later extended by the
Hanafis because of special circumstances in Iraq. Professor Joseph
Schacht seems to think that the common starting point of the Medinese
and Iraqian doctrines (later, Maliki and Hanafi) was a formula that "the
right of pre-emption goes by gates, and the person whose gate is nearest
has the best right to pre-emption", but that the final Medinese doctrine
became more restrictive and limited the right to the co-owner.3 The pre-
ponderance of evidence points to an original doctrine that allowed the co-
owner or co-sharer to exercise preemption. However, this doctrine was
enlarged by the Iraqis to include others, due to special circumstances in
Iraq where the Hanafi school developed.
Jurists say the very basis of shuftah is, of course, the avoidance of injury
that might result from having a stranger as a co-sharer or a neighbor.4 In
Medina, where the Maliki school developed, the householders and land-
owners were Arabs who descended from the known clans or from the
Meccan emigrants. Each of the original clans had its own quarter in the
city. Outsiders consisted of either slaves or traders. Hence, there was not a
pressing need for a developed system of shufah to keep strangers out of a
neighborhood. All that was necessary to protect a co-sharer from being
injured by the possibility of having a co-sharer in his own property that
he may thoroughly detest, was the right to exercise shufah should his co-
sharer sell his share. In any case, co-sharers were usually members of the
same family who inherited the property from a common ancestor since
nothing is more natural than to strive to keep the property within the
family. An interesting parallel might be the French principle of family
joint ownership which was adopted by the Egyptian Civil Code of 1949.
According to article 853 of that code, no co-owner can dispose of his share
in favor of a person who is not a member of the family without the consent
of all the co-owners.
Malik insists that only a co-sharer can exercise shufah, and reiterates
that such was the practice in Medina. He quotes a hadfth5 on the author- .,
ity of Abu Salamah saying: "The Messenger of God adjudged shuifah to be
operative in (property) which has not been divided among the co-sharers;
if the boundaries get established among them, then there can be no shuf-
cah." Malik then says, "This is the practice (sunnah) concerning which
there is no difference of opinion among us."6
In Iraq, on the other hand, the circumstances were quite different. The
Arabian tribes that settled in the two camp cities of Basrah and Kufah
were joined with many non-Arab converts to Islam. The admixture of
populations with varying linguistic and ethnic backgrounds produced a
a J. SCHACHT, ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE 219 (1950).
See, e.g., 13 AL-SARAKHSI, AL-MABSUT 93 (1324 A.H.).
A hadfth is a report of a saying, an action, or a tacit approval by the Prophet
Mulhanmad.
6 MALIK IBN ANAS, AL-MUWATrA' 103 (Cairo 1951).
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situation in which distinctions among the various classes of people were
reflected in some legal norms. It has been pointed out elsewhere7 that this
situation had produced a complicated system of Kafd'ah or "equality" in
the law of marriage, designating which men could "measure up" to which
women for the purpose of marriage, thereby reflecting social stratification
in that society, although the doctrine might have originated in Arabia in a
rather simple form.8 It is not strange, therefore, that a complicated and
systematic doctrine of shufah, which obviously aims at keeping undesir-
ables out of a neighborhood, should have developed in Iraq. Furthermore,
Iraq was an heir to some of the legal traditions or concepts of Roman law,
and although that law did not have a full-fledged institution of preemp-
tion, it did possess some regulations which produced similar effects. For
example, by a law issued by the Senate in the time of Marcus Aurelius,9 a
co-owner of a house could acquire the share of the other co-owner if the
latter did not pay his share of the repair expenses within four months of
the repair.10 Later, in the period of the Byzantine emperor Justinian,"
when the institution of emphyteusis, or long lease of lands, was reformed,
it was stipulated that the lessee who wished to sell his right to the lease
should give notice to the owner of the land. The owner would then have
the choice, within two months, of taking the land himself for the offered
sale price of the lease, or of concurring with the sale in return for 2% of
the sale price.12
Prior to the full development of the doctrine by Abu Hanifah and his
students, various attempts to enlarge the circle of persons who could
exercise shufah are discernable. In one such attempt, the statement that
"the right of preemption goes by gates, and the person whose gate is
nearest has the best right of preemption," was attributed to Shurayh, the
legendary judge of the first century. Shurayb, was said to have been ap-
pointed to Kfifah by the Caliph cUmar and who presumably died before
the year 80 A.H. Al-Sarakhsi, who quotes this statement, is careful to say
that he and his fellow Hanafis do not subscribe to this view, as only an
adjoining neighbor is entitled to shufah by neighborliness, not a neigh-
bor across the street.13 This indicates that the attempt to enlarge the
circle of persons who could exercise shufah was not completely successful.
A statement of Shurayh, however, cannot be as authoritative as a saying
of the Prophet if establishing a legal doctrine enlarging the circle of
7 Ziadeh, Equality (Kafd'ah) in the Muslim Law of Marriage, 6 Am. J. COMP. L. 503-17
(1957).
8 Id.
9 161-180 A.D.
10 P.E Girard, Manuel Etementaire de Droit Romain 339 (1929), quoted in 'UMAR M.
MUSTAFA, AL-QAN-UN AL ROMAI 347 (1966).
11 527-565 A.D.
" UMAR M. MUSTAFA, AL-QANN AL-RoMAMI 402 (1966).
13 See supra note 4, at 93.
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persons who can exercise shufah is desired. Accordingly, two traditions
were "discovered" which would support such a doctrine. One goes back to
the Companion Abu Rafic who heard the Prophet say, 'A neighbor is more
entitled to his proximity (saqab)." The other, with which the Basrians
armed themselves, goes back to the Companion Jabir who quoted the
Prophet as saying, "A neighbor is more entitled to his shufah-it awaits
him if he is absent-if the road (to both properties) be the same. ' 14 This
being so, the stage is set for Abu Hanifah to consolidate the doctrine in
Iraq by giving the right of shu fah first to the co-owner of the property
sold, then to the co-owner of a right attaching to the property sold, and
then to the adjoining neighbor. 5
However, the doctrine that the neighbor can exercise shufah did not go
unchallenged. Attacks emanated from governmental as well as juristic
quarters and all indications were that it was an innovation that had not
yet taken root. There is evidence that two caliphs, one Umayyad and one
cAbbasid, fought it. cUmar ibn cAbd al-cAziz, who ruled from 99-101 A.H.,
wrote to cIyad ibn cUbaydallah, the chief judge of Egypt, saying,
You wrote saying that your judges are now adjudging shufah to
be for the neighbors successively. We say that we used to hear that
shufah belongs to the co-owner and to nobody else .... Ifshufah
were to be exercised by a neighbor ... then no sooner would a
person (buy) a piece of land than it devolves to his neighbor until
a stop is put to all development. 16
Abu al-cAbbas, who ruled from 132-136 A.H., was the first cAbbasid
caliph. He ordered the Iraqi judge Ibn Abi Layala, who held the same
opinions as that of Abu Hanifa on shufah, not to grant shufah except to a
co-owner who had not partitioned his share. A1-ShAfi'i, who related this
story, said that this was also the opinion of the people of Hejaz, and that
the companions cAli and Ibn cAbbas were of the same opinion as well. 17 It
is interesting to note, however, that Hanafi judges continued to grant
shufah to a neighbor. One such judge was Bakk&r ibn Qutaybah, who was
appointed to office in Egypt in 246 A.H. under Alhmad ibn Thlfn, the
cAbb&sid governor. In the court of this judge a man sued another, a
Shificite concerning shufah by neighborliness. The defendant denied the
claim. When Bakkar knew that the defendant was a cdlim, or scholar in
religious sciences, he asked the plaintiff, "Do you have witnesses?" "No,"
he said. The judge said to the defendant, "Will you swear (that he has no
14 See the discussion of these two traditions by al-Shfici in his KrrAB IKHTILAF AL-
HADITH on the margin of 1 AL-UMM 218-65 (1968).
1 All Hanafi works give this order of priority. See, e.g., supra note 4, at 94.
16 Mu .AMMAD AL-KINDI, KJTAB AL-WULAT WA KITAB AL-QUDAT, 334-35 (R. Guest ed.
1912). We read the word ashala in the text as ibta "to buy."
17 AL-SHAFICI, 7 AL-UMM 99 (1968).
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claim against you?)" The latter replied, "Yes." The judge added to the oath
the statement: "not even according to the doctrine of those who grant
shuftah by neighborliness?", whereupon the defendant refrained from
giving the oath. Accordingly, Bakkar ruled that the plaintiff was entitled
to his shufah. When the defendant informed the famous Shaficite jurist
al-Muzani of the case, the latter observed, "You have chanced upon a
learned judge."' 8
The most systematic attack against shufah, other than through joint
ownership, was made by al-Shafici in his inimitable dialectical style. He
insisted that the sunnah, or the practice of the community, can only be
established by traditions from the Prophet, making it necessary for him
to distinguish the two traditions on which his opponents had depended.
The first tradition, that the neighbor is more entitled to his neigh-
borliness, was made subject to another tradition which limited shufah to
a co-owner so that only a neighbor who had not partitioned his share away
from his co-owner could exercise shuf]ah.
Al-ShAfici follows two courses in setting aside the tradition that a
neighbor can exercise shufah if the road leading to the two properties be
jointly owned; one by dialectics and the other by casting aspersion on its
authenticity. This first argument states:
One of the Basrians says, "Shutah can only be granted to a co-
owner, but the two-if they be co-owners of the road after having
divided up the dwelling-are still co-owners". It can be then put
to him, "Are they co-owners of the dwelling or of the road?" If he
says, "of the road, not the dwelling," it can be asked, "Why, then
did you apply shufah to the dwelling in which they are not co-
owners .... It behooves you to say that if the road is sold-and
roads can be sold and divided-then shufah should apply to it,
but not to what has already been partitioned of the dwelling."'19
Of his second course, casting aspersion on the authenticity of the tradi-
tion, al-Shafici said, "We heard a scholar of traditions say: 'We fear that
his tradition is not upheld (ma4f.an)'.' '20
The Hanafis, of course, disagree with this reasoning. Not only do they
assert the centricity of the traditions that give shuftah to the co-owner of
a road leading to the two properties and to the adjoining neighbor, they
also seem to regard neighborliness the determining factor in decreeing
shufah. Al-Sarakhsi, who compiled a digest of the works of al-Shaybani
in his book al-Mabszi says:
'8 IBN HAJAR AL-CAsQALANI, RAFCAL-ISR CAN QUDAT MISR, appended to M. AL-KINDI,
supra note 16, at 153.
19 See supra note 14, at 265.
20 Id.
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The entitlement for shufah is by neighborliness, not co-
ownership. For co-ownership occurs in movables also, but shuftah
is limited only to immovables. There must be, therefore, a reason
for this difference (between movables and immovables). The rea-
son is not but the fact that co-ownership in an immovable leads to
neighborliness when the co-owners partition the property,
whereas co-ownership of movables does not lead to neighborliness
.... Thus neighborliness is more preferable (as a factor), because
the aim is to avoid an injury to a person on account of a continu-
ous bad neighborliness.., and not on account of the trouble (a co-
owner) might go through in partitioning the property.21
Al-Sarakhsi concedes, though, that co-ownership will give preference to
one neighbor over another; he exemplifies this by providing the example
of a jointly-owned house in a courtyard branching off from a blind alley. If
one of the two co-owners sells his share, his co-owner is entitled to shuf-
cah. If the latter concedes, the co-owners of the courtyard have preference
over the co-owners of the alley. If these owners concede successively, then
the adjoining neighbor, whose house rests on top of the jointly-owned
house with its doorway leading to another alley, gets the right to shufah.22
As can be readily perceived, the protagonists of each school were actu-
ally using traditions, logic, or simply opinion to justify what Schacht has
dubbed their "living tradition" or living practice. Aside from the question
of their authenticity, these traditions were either limited, interpreted, or
declared questionable in order to fit a predetermined position on shufah
that had taken a concrete form due to social or economic considerations.
As Tahaiwi points out, there were three positions at the beginning of the
third century A.H. The first was that of Malik and al-Shafici which
granted shuftah only to the co-owner who did not partition his share. The
second was that of the Basrians who extended the right to include the
previous co-owner who is a co-owner of the road leading to the two proper-
ties. The third was that of Abu Hanifah and his students who additionally
gave the right to the adjoining neighbor.23 The Basrian doctrine did not
continue independently, but was absorbed into the Hanafi doctrine; hence
only two positions survived. Tahawi, who composed his work on legal
formularies in the second half of the third century, was careful, as a
Hanafi, to include a form for the exercise of shufah by an adjoining
neighbor.24
Due to the absence of legal reporting in the centuries that followed, it is
not known how this legal institution fared. What is known is that by the
21 14 AL-MABSOT 95.
22 Id. at 96.
23 AHMAD AL-TAHAWI, KrTAB AL-SHUFCAH MIN AL-JAMIC AL-KABIR FI AL-SHUROT
(Joseph Schacht ed.), in 20 HEIDELBERGER AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN 3 (1929-30).
24 Id. at 58.
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time the Ottomans, who had adopted the Hanafi rite as the official rite of
their state, extended their sway over most of the Near East and North
Africa, Hanafi jurisprudence, including the institution of shufah, was
given a wider scope. Hanafi works elaborated the doctrine until it was
codified in the Ottoman Mejelle in 1869. The Ottoman Empire's successor
states in the Near East adopted varying positions vis-d-vis this doctrine, a
subject that will presently be addressed.
Prior to the promulgation of modern codes in Egypt, preemption was
applied by the courts according to the doctrines of Islamic law. With the
promulgation of the Mixed Code, applied by the Mixed Courts which were
created in 1876, and the National Code, applied by the National Courts
which came into existence in 1883, preemption began to be regulated by
statute. The two codes, however, differed with regard to some incidents of
preemption. The resulting confusion in the courts moved the Egyptian
government to issue two laws, one dated March 26, 1900 for the Mixed
Courts, and the other dated March 23, 1901 for the National Courts.
These laws regulated preemption and superseded the provision of the
codes governing that subject. The new Egyptian Civil Code of 1949 based
itself on those two laws relative to preemption, and the subject once again
became a part of the Civil Code. Before its incorporation in the Civil
Code, preemption was subject to controversy in the various committees
studying its codification. The major argument against preemption was
that it restrains freedom of contract, and in any case, was no longer
necessary in the modem world. This is particularly true in the case of
preemption by a neighbor who substitutes himself for a purchaser to keep
that purchaser out of the neighborhood. Ultimately, the doctrine was re-
tained for historical reasons and certain beneficial effects such as group-
ing together the elements of the right of ownership when the right of
usufruct is joined to the bare right of ownership by exercising the right of
preemption. However, the doctrine was severely restricted as to substance
and procedure.
The right of preemption belongs to the following in the order given: (a)
to the bare owner, in the case of a sale of all or part of the usufruct, (b) to
the co-owner in common, in the case of a sale to a third party of a part of
common property, (c) to the usufructuary, in the case of a sale of all or part
of the bare property, (d) in the case of hikr (long lease of waqf, or even
private lands), to the bare owner if the sale relates to the right of hikr, and
to the beneficiary of the hikr if the sale relates to the bare property, and
(e) to the neighboring owner in the following cases: (i) in the case of
buildings or building land whether situated in a town or in a village, (ii) if
the land enjoys a right of servitude over the land of a neighbor, or if a
right of servitude exists in favor of the land of a neighbor over the land
sold, and (iii) if the land of a neighbor adjoins the land sold on two sides
and the value is at least half of the value of the land sold. If several
persons of the same degree exercise the right of preemption, a proportion-
ate right of preemption will belong to each one of them, unless one of them
1985-86]
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is the purchaser. In that case, the purchaser takes precedence over others
of the same or lower degrees.2 5
Compared to the sharicah or previous legislation, the number of persons
given the right of preemption by neighborliness has been reduced. The
exercise of preemption is also prevented in the following cases: (a) if the
sale is made by public auction, (b) if the sale is made between ascendants
and descendants, between spouses, between relatives to the fourth degree,
or between relatives by marriage to the second degree, and (c) if the
property sold is destined for religious purposes, or to be annexed to prop-
erty already used for such purposes. A waqf,26 however, cannot exercise
the right of preemption.
27
The sharilah has always considered preemption as a weak right which
lapses absent strict adherence to the conditions laid down for its exercise.
The Code, therefore, contains specific provisions as to notification by the
preemptor to both the vendor and the purchaser of his intention to pre-
empt following his being served with a notice giving full description of the
property sold, and the parties to the sale,28 and as to the initiation of
process within a strict time limit.29 An innovation of the new code, which
further restricts the right of preemption, is the requirement that the
actual sale price must be deposited in full at the treasury of the district
court in which the property is situated before the introduction of the
preemption action.30 This provision was designed to discourage actions in
which the main purpose was to extort money from the parties to a sale by
threatening to initiate an action for preemption.
Another aspect of the maxim that the right of preemption is weak is the
assertion by jurists that this right is attached to the person of the pre-
emptor.3' The original version of the code article that defined preemp-
tion3 2 contained a provision stating that the right of preemption could not
be transferred by assignment or inheritance. This provision was deleted
during the final consideration of the article by a Senate committee, and
the matter "was left to the interpretation of the judiciary. 33 AI-Sanhuri,
the main architect of the Code, asserts that several results flow from the
"personal" nature of the preemptor's right: (1) the creditors of the pre-
emptor cannot exercise the right of preemption by substituting them-
selves for the preemptor, (2) preemption cannot be assigned by the
preemptor to another person, (3) the preemptor can renounce his right
25 Egyptian Civil Code, arts. 936-37 (1949).
26 An Islamic charitable trust created by an endowment.
27 Egyptian Civil Code, art. 939.
- Id., arts. 940-41.
Id., art. 943.
- Id., art. 942.
31 See A. AL-SANHURI, 9 AL-WAsIT 452-72 (1970).
32 Egyptian Civil Code, art. 935.
33 Id.
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after, and even before, its cause has arisen,3 4 and (4) the right of preemp-
tion does not descend by inheritance to the heirs if the preemptor dies
before declaring his intention to preempt. On this last point, however, a
conflict of opinion exists, as some jurists, supported by certain court deci-
sion, assert that the right is heritable. 35 Be that as it may, there is no
doubt that the new code looked askance at the doctrine of preemption,
limiting it even more severely than previous legislation had done.3 Mod-
em reformers think that preemption restricts freedom of contract, intro-
duces an element of instability in real estate dealings, and fails to be
consonant with modern ideas of equal treatment by the law.
In Syria, preemption was formerly regulated by the French Mandatory
Government's Decree No. 3339 of 1930, which is still in force in Lebanon,
and which shall be called the Lebanese Property Law.37 Preemption in
Lebanon according to this law will be dealt with presently. In Syria, the
Civil Code of 1949 abolished this institution completely because, as the
Explanatory Memorandum put it, "it is, in fact, a weak right and the
social and economic life in Syria does not necessitate its adoption. 38
The Lebanese Property Law dealt with preemption in articles 238-54,
but the institution was extensively amended by the Law of February 5,
1948. It should be noted that preemption in Lebanon has a wider connota-
tion than that in Egypt. In Lebanon it applies not only to sale of
ownership, usufruct, and hikr, but to the sale of several other real rights.
It may be defined as the option available to some owners of real rights in
compelling their acquisition of a real right that has devolved to others by
a contract of sale or by gift with consideration.39 The rights that can be
thus acquired are ownership, possession (tasarru), usufruct, right of sup-
port (sathtyah), right of musdqdt (contract to tend trees or crops of another
person for share of crops), ijdratayn (a perpetual lease of waqf property),
and long lease (muqdtacah). Since tasarruf applies to mtri lands,40 pre-
emption in Lebanon also embraces these lands. In other countries, these
lands are subject to a right similar but distinct from preemption called
the right of preference (haqq al-awlawiyah wa al-rujhin).
In Lebanon the right of preemption belongs to the following persons in
the following order: (1) the owners of the fee simple concerning the right
of usufruct, (2) the owner in common if a share or more in the property
held in common is sold to an outsider, (3) the holder of the right of usu-
fruct concerning the fee simple of the property, (4) the owner of the fee
simple concerning a hikr, right of support (sa.thiyah), ijaratayn, long lease
3- Id., art. 948.
-s See id. for the arguments of both parties.
3 For example, a neighbor no longer has an automatic right of preemption.
37 Syria and Lebanon used to be administered jointly by the French.
38 THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC: MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, AL-QANUN AL-MADANI 10 (1949).
39 E. TYAN, AL-NIzAA AL-CAQAU Fi LuBRAN 85 (1954).
4D Government lands whose possession is held by individuals.
1985-86]
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(muqdtacah), and the right to musdqdt, (5) the adjoining neighbor if the
property subject to preemption has a servitude over his property, or if his
property has a servitude over the property subject to preemption, or if
both property owners share in the ownership of a private road or a divid-
ing wall or a special right of watering, (6) the owner of a floor in a building
concerning the other floors. If persons of equal rank compete for the right
of preemption, in the first four ranks, above, the entitlement of each one of
them in the right of preemption is proportionate to his share in the origi-
nal right entitled to preemption. In the fifth rank the person benefiting
from preemption would be given preference. In the case that several
owners of floors compete, the owner of the ground floor is given
preference. 41
Restrictions on the right of preemption in Lebanon provide that the
right cannot be exercised if the sale takes place between spouses, descen-
dents and ascendents, or brothers and sisters. Also, if the right is to be
exercised, it must be exercised in toto. In addition, the right is personal,
like that in Egypt, and therefore cannot be sold. However, contrary to
Islamic law and the dominant opinion in Egypt, the right to preemption
in Lebanon descends to the heirs by inheritance exactly like other rights
and properties.'2
The Libyan provisions on the subject were derived from the Egyptian
Code; therefore the differences between the two codes are few and pertain
primarily to the persons having the right of preemption. The persons
having the right of preemption are: (1) the owner of the fee simple in the
sale of the right of usufruct, (2) the owner in common in the sale of a share
in the property, and (3) the owner of the right to usufruct in the sale of the
bare ownership.43
In Iraq, the law on the subject resembles that of Egypt in all its essen-
tials except that the persons having the right of preemption are: (1) the
owner in common in the sale of a share in the property, (2) the co-owner of
a servitude in favor of the property being sold, and (3) the adjoining
neighbor in the event that both properties are for habitation or being
prepared for habitation, or one of the properties has a servitude over the
other. Other situations in which the right of preemption is mentioned in
the Egyptian Code and are not mentioned in the Iraqi Code pertain to
miri and waqf properties in Iraq. These are not subject to preemption, but
subject to a right similar to preemption known as the right of preference
(.aqq al-awlawiyah wa al-rujhdn).44 This right, hereafter awlatyah, first
regulated by articles 41-45 of the Ottoman Land Code 5 and later incorpo-
41 Lebanese Property Law, arts. 239-40.
42 See E. TYAN, supra note 39, at 85-87.
43 Libyan Code, art. 940.
4 Priorities in this right are different from those in preemption.
4 R.C. TUTE, THE OTTOMAN LAND LAws (1927).
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rated in the Iraqi Civil Code,46 departed from preemption in that it did not
recognize a neighbor among the persons entitled to exercise it, and it
allowed its exercise even in cases where no consideration was provided for
in the original contract of sale. The code stipulated that if the mutasarrif
(possessor of mtri land) transfers his land for a consideration or no consid-
eration, the following persons, in the order given, can take the land upon
demand by paying its true price (badal al-mithl): (1) the co-sharer in the
land transferred, (2) the co-sharer in a servitude in favor of the land
transferred, (3) the owner of trees and buildings standing on the land
transferred, and (4) he who has a need for land from among the people of
the village where the land is situated.47 Except for the foregoing, the rules
pertaining to preemption apply to awlawtyah and, in particular, to the
rules relating to competition among persons of the same rank to take the
property.4
In Jordan the rules of preemption and awlawtyah differ little from
those in Iraq.49 The same persons are entitled to both rights in the two
countries except that in Jordan there are no qualifications placed upon
the adjoining neighbor to exercise preemption.50 There are differences in
some of the situations where a claim for preemption can be barred.51
Claims are barred in the following situations:
1. If the sale takes place by means of a public auction prescribed
by law. (Both codes agree). 2. If the sale is between spouses, or
between descendents and ascendents, or between near relatives
up to the fourth degree. (Both codes agree, but the Jordanian
Code adds to the list relatives by marriage up to the second de-
gree.) 3. If the property sold is to be used as a place of worship or
to be joined to a place of worship. (A provision found only in the
Iraqi code.) 4. If the preemptor declines his right either expressly
or by implication. (Both codes agree.) 5. If the property by means
of which preemption is to be exercised is waqf. (Both codes agree,
but the Jordanian Code also would bar preemption in case a waqf
property is being sold.) 6. If six months have elapsed since the
completion of the sale, even though the holder of the right of
preemption is either interdicted or is absent and is, therefore,
unable to exercise his rights. (A provision found only in the Iraqi
Code).
4 Iraqi Civil Case, arts. 1216-17.
47 Id. at 1216.
4 Id. MUSTAFA, 2 AL-MILKIYAH AL-cAQAXRYAH F1 AL-CIRAQ 115-17 (1964).
49 Jordanian Code, arts. 1150-70.
50 Id. art. 1151.
91 Iraqi Civil Code, art. 1134; Jordanian Code, arts. 1159-61.
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Shufah is an excellent example of the continuity of an Islamic institu-
tion and of the capacity of that institution for change. Although it is not,
strictly speaking, a part of personal status law, which is said to be the
only part of Islamic law that is being applied in Islamic countries, it has
survived in a recognizable form.
Islamic countries, in their attempts at law reform, have effected little
change in the traditional law of personal states, only after heated discus-
sions and controversy.52 On the other hand, profound changes were intro-
duced into the traditional law of preemption with little controversy. The
difference in the attitude of law reformers to change in these two areas
might be attributable to the fact that rights in personal status law were
considered by the jurists the very heart of Islamic law and, therefore,
sacrosanct, while the right to preemption was considered a "weak right"
and, therefore, more amenable to change.
52 See N. ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD (1976).
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